Fear of failure can dominate the choices of individuals. We model its role in the decision to become an entrepreneur and subsequent investments made in pursuit of success using the framework of loss aversion. We show that when the threshold for success is su¢ ciently high, fear of failure motivates additional sacri…ces by entrepreneurs. When the threshold for success stems from foregone outside options, on the other hand, fear of failure is always de-motivating. Finally, regardless of the yardstick used to measure success, fear of failure is negatively associated with entry into entrepreneurship. Our …ndings highlight the importance of the interaction between the degree of fear of failure and the aspirations of the would-be entrepreneur.
Introduction
Jill Blashack Strahan calls it the fear factor-the moments of overpowering doubt when success seems impossible. For Strahan one such moment was when every aspect of life seemed to be collapsing around her. Three months behind on her mortgage and grieving over the death of her beloved brother, she was now, suddenly, a widow, confronting the scary prospect of raising her …ve year old son Zach alone. "The night after the funeral of my husband, I thought maybe I should give up, get a job and be a mom." said Strahan in an interview with Entrepreneur magazine.
No one would blame her for doing exactly that. Many in Strahan's position would put entrepreneurial dreams on hold, possibly permanently, even when confronted with less daunting circumstances. But not her. " I began living my life one minute at a time and living it with more intention," Strahan said in an interview. She threw her entire savings, and, indeed, her entire life into her venture, working 80 hour weeks without letup for more than a decade.
For Strahan, the fear factor became a source of strength and power-her secret weapon in the struggle to succeed. And succeed she did; her company, Tastefully Simple, grossed nearly $100 million in 2012 and continues to grow. Yet she acknowledges that not everyone responds as she did.
People cope with fear of failure in many ways, some good, some bad. In Strahan's pithy phrase, "You always have a choice. You can get better or get bitter." 1 Will Smith was a small-time Philadelphia rapper when his collaboration with DJ Jazzy Je¤, "Parents Just Don't Understand" became a breakout hit. For most artists this success represents their crowning moment, the pinnacle of their artistic career. It did for Jazzy Je¤, but not for Smith. He leapt from success to success, landing a lead role in a popular television series and then parlaying this into increasingly visible, and well paid, cinematic roles. By now, Smith ranks among the handful of A-list Hollywood actors who command tens of millions of dollars for a lead role.
When asked about his success, Smith turns the conversation to failure. "I've always had a horrible fear of not achieving . . . "he told Parade magazine. "All it takes is just one person telling me I can't do it, and I'll use the fear of failure as fuel." 2 Like Strahan, these negative thoughts are a source of power for Smith.
We all su¤er from fear of failure to varying degrees. So pervasive is this problem that an enormous self-help industry has arisen to help people overcome these fears. Indeed, search the terms entrepreneur and fear of failure and you will …nd thousands of sites and articles o¤ering helpful advice. Yet, if Strahan and Smith are representative, such fears, perversely, represent a secret weapon for success.
We investigate the many facets of fear of failure-how it a¤ects the decision to become an entrepreneur and the sacri…ces made in pursuit of success. Of particular interest is whether the examples of Strahan and Smith are, in any way, representative. Put di¤erently, we ask whether there is such a thing as "the power of negative thinking." Unfortunately, little data exists on this aspect of personality, so researchers have only anecdotes to go on. We add to this by o¤ering a theory of entrepreneurship when individuals su¤er from fear of failure.
By its very nature, fear of failure requires some internal yardstick for counting whether outcomes are successes or failures. In other words, outcomes are judged, not in their own right, but relative to some benchmark, which we call the aspiration level. The degree of fear of failure then represents the di¤erence in the pain su¤ered from falling short of the mark versus the pleasure gained from exceeding it by the same amount. Modeled in this fashion, fear of failure can be seen as a type of loss aversion. We embed these payo¤s in a setting where individuals choose between employment, which o¤ers a safe return, and entrepreneurship, which is risky. Success in the latter depends upon investment in the venture and luck. It also depends on competition from other entrepreneurs.
While much of the extant literature focuses on the entry decision, the fateful moment when an individual takes the leap into entrepreneurship, at least as important are subsequent post-entry choices-the …nancial, physical, and emotional sacri…ces made in pursuit of success. These are presumably less studied because they are much harder to measure. A key distinction in our model and results, is its focus on this aspect of entrepreneurship and, importantly, the connection between anticipated sacri…ces made in pursuit of success and the decision to become an entrepreneur in the …rst place.That is, the impact of looking ahead to the obstacles and sacri…ces on today's decision to make the leap.
Formally, we model entrepreneurship as a two stage game where individuals …rst make a career decision and, following this, decide upon how much to sacri…ce in pursuit of success. Outcomes depend on the sacri…ces made, the level of competition, and luck. Individuals measure outcomes (and expected outcomes) through the lens of their aspiration level together with the degree to which they su¤er from fear of failure. Our main …ndings are the following:
1. Fear of failure can motivate additional sacri…ces by entrepreneurs. Provided aspiration levels are high enough, greater fear of failure produces greater investment in the venture.
2. When aspiration levels are low or, alternatively, when they are calibrated to foregone employment earnings, fear of failure is de-motivating to entrepreneurs-greater fear of failure produces less investment.
3. Regardless of aspiration levels, fear of failure dissuades individuals from entrepreneurship:
The greater is fear of failure, the less likely is an individual to choose entrepreneurship.
Our main result show that the impact of fear of failure varies enormously with context. When choosing a career, fear of failure is indeed debilitating and self-help articles o¤ering ways to overcome this fear may indeed have value. Post-entry, however, fear of failure need not be an a-iction to be "cured." Aspirations play a critical role. For those holding lofty aspiration, fear of failure can indeed be a "fuel" to success, as in Will Smith's phrase, but with more modest ambitions, Jill
Strahan's fear factor merely produces sleepless nights and cautious days. Individuals hedge their bets, limiting the sacri…ces owing to the worry that each dollar sacri…ced will merely produce more pain and regret when things don't work out.
From an empirical perspective, we see these results as opening a new, and possibly quite fruitful, path of research. While fear of failure is much talked about, it has, so far, been little studied empirically. Perhaps the most important …nding from our model is that these fears cannot be studied in isolation, but must be interacted with individual aspirations. Not doing so would produce a misleading (and misspeci…ed) prediction.
The remainder of this section places the model in the context of the extant literature. In section 2, we formally lay out the model itself. Section 3 analyzes equilibrium behavior, ultimately endogenizing aspiration levels based on outside wages. Section 4 extends the basic model in various directions and shows that results 1-3 are not model speci…c, but rather general economic intuitions deriving from a context in which individuals measure outcomes relative to aspiration levels and su¤er from fear of failure. Finally, section 5 concludes. An appendix contains proofs for all results.
Related Literature
Fear of failure is often seen as an impediment to starting a business. Several empirical studies investigate the strength of this e¤ect using survey data and con…rm a negative correlation between self-reported fear of failure and the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur. 3 Interestingly, most studies view fear of failure as a form of risk aversion. We add to this debate by pointing out how fear of failure better represents a form of loss rather than risk aversion. The di¤erence might seem to be mere semantics; however, the two models of risk evaluation di¤er in key respects, most notably There are relatively few theory models of entrepreneurial entry and none which account for fear of failure and, more broadly, loss aversion. The previous models emphasize selection based on ability or risk preferences using conventional expected utility. 4 Besides our emphasis on fear of failure, a key contribution is to highlight how an entrepreneur's foregone outside options continue to drive post-entry decisions.
In assessing the usefulness of such a contribution, it is important to highlight recent evidence for selection based on loss aversion. Important …ndings in this regard come from Koudstaal, Sloof and van Praag (2014), who compare preferences of entrepreneurs to managers. Using non-incentivized survey data, they replicate the standard …nding that entrepreneurs are less risk averse than managers. Using incentivized preference elicitation, these di¤erences disappear. Instead, they …nd that entrepreneurs are less loss averse than are managers. Koudstaal, et al. explain this shift by noting that, when answering survey questions about risky choice, individuals tend to con ‡ate risk and loss aversion.
Our model adds to the growing literature incorporating behavioral factors to explain entrepreneurship. The extant literature has mainly emphasized overoptimism as a key selection force. 5 Nonetheless, there is increasing recognition of the importance of loss aversion. For instance, Langer contest. A key distinction between our study and theirs, besides the obvious di¤erence in application, concerns the role of the reference point. Unlike Cornes and Hartley, we allow the reference point to vary, sometimes endogenously, and many of our main …ndings relate to this variation. This permits us to examine how the yardstick used for determining success drives entry and subsequent investment, a lever entirely absent from the extant literature.
More broadly, Gill and Stone (2010) study loss aversion in two-player tournaments (a related game) where the reference point depends on relative investments. In a related paper, Gill and Prowse (2012) …nd experimental evidence of loss aversion in real e¤ort tournaments. While the gist of these papers, that loss aversion is important in understanding risky choice, is similar to our study, the absence of entry, the structure of the game, and the formation of the reference point all di¤er substantially from our formulation.
The Model
Consider a situation where N 2 individuals contemplate the choice between employment and entrepreneurship. Our main concern is to understand how fear of failure, i.e. the pain associated with falling short of some aspiration level, drives both entry into entrepreneurship as well as subsequent investment in the entrepreneurial venture. Fear of failure motives appear prominent both in surveys of entrepreneurs and in autobiographical descriptions entrepreneurs give about their motives. Our goal is to incorporate such motives formally in a game-theory model of choosing the entrepreneurship path. We describe precisely how we model these two features of preferences below.
In choosing employment, an individual enjoys a …xed wage w which is added to her initial wealth W i . We assume that the cohort of potential entrepreneurs is small relative to the size of the (unmodeled) labor market, so each person takes the wage as given, and their choices have no e¤ect on the market wage even if all N pursue employment.
Alternatively, an individual may choose entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship di¤ers from employment along many dimensions: Entrepreneurs do not answer to a boss, nor work on a set schedule of hours, but perhaps the most important di¤erence concerns the connection between investment/e¤ort and outcomes. Whereas a typical employee will have some small e¤ect on the success or failure of the …rm by her e¤orts, a typical entrepreneur's e¤orts and investment will have a profound e¤ect on outcomes. Yet e¤ort and investment alone do not guarantee success. Compe-tition in the marketplace, including from other entrepreneurs, can seriously impede the chances of even the most hard-working. For instance, a restaurateur opening shop in a busy downtown area will likely not be alone-her success also depends, in part, on the investments of rival restaurants just down the street. Even apart from e¤ort and competition, luck also has an important role to play. "Auntie" Anne Beiler ran one of the many small food stands at a farmer's market in Downingtown, Pennsylvania in 1988. She was trying to scrape by and hoped the stand would raise enough money for her real passion, community outreach. But her unique pretzel recipe, a chance discovery, propelled her to tremendous fortune with over 1,000 Auntie Anne's franchises operating currently. 6 To account for the mix of e¤ort, investment, strategic risk, and luck in determining outcomes, we model the entrepreneurship path as a winner-take-all market that awards a "prize" equal to R > w to the winning individual. The prize, R; should be understood as the long-run value of becoming a dominant player in the market. That is, it represents the net present value of future cash ‡ows resulting from success. Individuals not "winning"the market should be viewed as having achieved some small level of pro…t, but nothing that might be counted as true success. For instance, of all the farm stands at the Downingtown market, Auntie Anne's clearly "won,"but this does not mean that the others received no customers whatever, simply that, compared to Auntie Anne's, their earnings were minimal.
Individuals choosing the entrepreneurship path simultaneously make investments e i , which represent a combination of …nancial commitments as well as sweat equity in the form of long hours and intense e¤ort. Investment represents e¤orts over and above those required under employment, which we normalize at zero. Furthermore, investment should be understood to be happening over time, as the business evolves from its embryonic stage. Typically, such investments are largely invisible to competitors and so may be safely modeled as a simultaneous game even though the investments themselves are not, literally, occurring at the same moment. Costs are assumed to be linear in investment, and there is no upper bound on the amount of investment an individual might choose to undertake. 7 The combination of investment and luck determine a …rm's "performance," i.e. a measure of its e¤ectiveness in the market. Speci…cally, …rm i's performance is equal to y i = e i " i where 6 Source: http://www.auntieannes.com/our-story/company-history 7 Neither assumption is important. Nonlinear costs are readily handled simply by appropriately transforming the contest success function. Upper bounds on investment are likewise of no consequence so long as they are su¢ ciently generous. For instance, any upper bound on investment of R or higher leaves the analysis entirely unchanged.
e i represents individual i's investment while " i represents luck, which is the realization from a
Weibull extreme value distribution with mean equal to one. 8 Thus, luck is unbiased in that, on average, the highest investing …rm will also be the highest performing. Moreover, the market is fair in the sense that the highest performing …rm wins. The luck element, however, ensures that the highest investing …rm is not necessarily the highest performing; surprises, like the unexpected success of Auntie Anne, are quite possible. Formally, the highest performing entrepreneur receives reward R while the others receive nothing, and everyone pays the cost of their investments. This implies that, when n individuals choose to become entrepreneurs, the probability that entrepreneur i; investing e i , wins is simply e i = P n j=1 e j where, without loss of generality, we have assumed that the n individuals with the lowest indices choose to become entrepreneurs.
The structure of the success function, in particular, the pairwise independence in the probability of winning, the Luce property, means that the winner-take-all assumption is of little consequence.
Were we instead to assume that there were k winners (and hence n k losers), all of whom received the same prize, nothing would change so long as we adapted the chance of winning so as to retain the Luce property. We show this formally in Section 4. From here, one can readily see that the same intuitions hold in a model where there are k, possibly di¤ering, prizes, though the formal analysis of such a model would be fairly intractable. Thus, the winner-take-all assumption should be understood to be a mere convenience in performing analysis and gaining insights rather than a necessarily realistic modeling assumption for many entrepreneurial markets. For those inclined the use the model empirically, the extended, k prize model, is clearly more appropriate.
We now turn to entry. Here we assume that individuals choose their path (employment or entrepreneurship) in order of their indices. Thus, player 1 chooses …rst, followed by 2, and so on.
At the moment of choice, each individual is aware of the current market size, i.e. the total number of entrepreneurs in the market up to that point. While highly stylized, the speci…cs of the entry model are of no great consequence. Essentially, we are after a model that yields the usual competitive equilibrium prediction that payo¤s, both psychic and pecuniary, will be equalized across the two paths. Many extensive forms, including ours, produce this intuitive prediction. Thus, entry stage results will be robust to any alteration of the model retaining the competitive equilibrium property. 8 Empirical readers will readily recognize this speci…cation as being identical to the well-known McFadden random utility model for studying probabilitistic choice. (See, e.g. McFadden 1973 McFadden , 1974 .) The key advantage to this approach is that the likelihood of choosing option i versus j in a random utility context is independent of the other choices on o¤er, the so-called Luce property (Luce, 1959) , which proves extremely useful and ‡exible econometrically. Indeed, it is the only error speci…cation with this property. We adopt it for similar tractability and scalability reasons.
When determining entry and investment, individuals in the model care mainly about success and failure and, indeed, fear of failure plays a prominent role in their calculations. To model this, we assume that each individual i has a reference point, r i ; by which she judges success or failure.
Pecuniary outcomes exceeding the reference point count as success while those falling below count as failure. Thus, her payo¤s for a given monetary result, ! i , are simply ! i r i : To capture the idea of fear of failure, we assume that these outcomes deal an additional psychic blow, with coe¢ cient 
The model is motivated by increasing interest in the e¤ects of fear of failure on entrepreneurship; however, its essentials-the additional psychic cost of failure compared to success, and an aspiration level for counting outcomes as success-are analogous to the more generally observed phenomenon of loss aversion. Beginning with Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , there is, by now, substantial evidence that individuals code events, including …nancial events, not as absolutes but rather in relation to some reference point. While the particular reference point di¤ers depending on the setting and the individual, its presence has been fairly conclusively shown. Moreover, relative to the reference point, individuals tend to regard losses of a given magnitude as more painful than gains of the same magnitude are pleasurable. Many studies estimate that the di¤erence between the coe¢ cient on losses and gains is a factor approximately equal to two. 9 This is consistent with retrospective accounts of entrepreneurs being more a¤ected by the costs of failure than with the bene…ts of success. While fear of failure motivates our analysis, the model is isomorphic to one of loss averse preferences, where the fear of failure motive represents a special case. In the remainder of the paper, we sometimes use the term reference point, which should be understood to be synonymous with the aspiration level for success.
Like all models, ours is an incomplete description of all the features of entrepreneurship, employment, and the decision to switch between the two. For instance, the model contains nothing about the self-actualization bene…ts from being one's own boss or settting one's own hours. It contains nothing about an indivdual's life cycle and the possibility of repeatedly switching between the two paths. It says nothing about how access to capital bears on the entry decision or subsequent investment behavior. This is not because we think these factors are absent, but rather that they have no interplay with our main interest, fear of failure.
Equilibrium
In this section, we …rst study investments occurring post-entry. We pay particular attention to the e¤ects of di¤ering degrees of fear of failure and di¤ering reference points for counting a result as a success. We then examine the entry stage, again with an eye toward how fear of failure a¤ects the decision to become an entrepreneur in the …rst place.
The initial analysis treats the reference point as exogenous, yet, in many cases, the reference point is socially constructed. To allow for this, we close the model by imagining that individuals view the payo¤s from "the road not taken"-employment-as a benchmark for success.
Entrepreneurial Investments
Assume that the …rst i = 1; 2; :::; n 2 individuals choose the entrepreneurship path, and, for the moment, treat the reference point as exogenous. The location of the reference point plays a critical role in the analysis. The interesting case occurs when the following assumption is satis…ed:
Assumption 1 says that an individual pursuing entrepreneurship aspires to a return exceeding her initial wealth level but less than the sum of initial wealth and a fractional value of the prize.
The assumption merely ensures that winning the entrepreneurial market is coded as success while losing is coded as failure. Without Assumption 1, one can end up in situations where individuals code both winning and losing as success (or code both as failure) in which case preferences become, in e¤ect, risk-neutral and the analysis straightforward.
The gain/loss utility to entrepreneur i who makes investment e i is then
Given beliefs as to the total investment P k6 =i e k ; we may di¤erentiate with respect to e i to obtain a necessary condition for optimal (interior) investment:
The …rst term on the right-hand side represents the marginal pecuniary bene…t of increased investment, i.e. the higher chance of winning the prize multiplied by its value. The second (bracketed)
term represents the cost of increased investment (including psychic costs). The term i represents the (normalized) psychic cost of a unit of investment conditional on the failure state. The remaining terms in this expression represent the portion of investment costs rebated back in the success state, multiplied by the chance of success, e i = P e j . Were entrepreneurs risk-neutral, these would be the only terms comprising the optimization condition.
Loss aversion (or fear of failure), however, creates an additional reason to investment: gains from coding a given outcome as a success rather than a failure. These gains are expressed by the term in square brackets, which merely says that a given gain loss outcome x; changes value from i to 1 when it switches from being coded as a failure to being coded as a success. Finally, the summation expresssion is merely the increased chance of success from a unit of e¤ort. A key feature of this investment motive is that, the higher are aspirations, the greater are the gains in moving from failure to success and hence the greater the incentive to invest. That is to say that lofty aspirations (even if borne of overcon…dence) are self-motivating. A second key feature of this investment motive concerns fear of failure ( i ). Notice that, the greater is the fear of failure, the greater is the incentive to invest in avoiding failed outcomes. Unlike the reference point, fear of failure also appears elsewhere in the optimality condition, as a determining factor in the cost of investment. There, it had an opposite e¤ect, increasing the cost of investment and thus decreasing the incentive to invest. The overall e¤ect of fear of failure on an entrepreneur's incentive to invest is thus unclear. There is, however, a clear interaction e¤ect-the combination of loftier aspirations and greater fear of failure always produce greater incentives to invest, as a simple inspection of equation (2) reveals. We will return to this last point below, when we study equilibrium investment.
(Interior) equilibrium investments consist of a solution fe 1 ; e 2 ; :::; e n g to the n equation system whose representative equation is (2) : Since this system is highly nonlinear in e i ; conventional methods are not usable to obtain closed form answers for equilibrium e¤ort. To determine how the strategic interaction of entrepreneurs produces e¤ort, we will suppose that entrepreneurs have similar characteristics to one another. Note, though, that these characteristics may be quite di¤er-ent than those of non-entrepreneurs. Formally, assume that for i = 1; 2; :::; n, all parameters with i subscripts (i.e. i ; r i ; and so on) are identical across entrepreneurs. In that case, we can look for a symmetric equilibrium, i.e. e i = e for all i = 1; 2; :::; n: Under this assumption, equation (2) simpli…es to:
and this may be rewritten in closed form as e = n 1 (2n 1) + (n 1)
Of course, this derivation is merely heuristic. Our next proposition formally establishes that a unique symmetric equilibrium exists. This follows from the form of equation (3) : Checking endpoint conditions and applying the intermediate value theorem yields existence, while linearity in e implies uniqueness, regardless of the reference point r or the number of entrants n: Formally, Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, for a given r and n; equilibrium investment in the unique symmetric equilibrium is given by equation (4) :
Having established that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, we can perform comparative analyses to see how investment responds to changes in the economic or psychic environment. First, we study the economic factors. From equation (4), it may be readily observed that investment falls when there are more competitors and rises as the stakes (R) increase. This is reassuring since all standard expected utility models make the same (sensible) prediction. Thus, the addition of fear of failure/loss aversion does not fundamentally overturn intuitions about response to rewards and competition. Now, we study the psychic factors. As with our partial equilibrium study of equation (2) ; when individuals have higher reference points, the model predicts that they will make more investments and generally work harder. Whereas this "motivation e¤ect"gave an advantage to individual i when she was more motivated than her rivals, here, the reference points of all entrepreneurs increase.
An important implication of this outcome is that, in entrepreneurial segments, such as technology start-ups, where aspiration levels are very high, participating entrepreneurs will work much harder and invest much more than in segments, such as beauty salons, where aspiration levels are likely lower.
In normal conversation, we often associate hard work with greater chances of success. And, indeed, this is correct in a partial equilibrium sense even in our model. That is, …xing the e¤orts of all competitors save one, the harder working is this last competitor, the greater her chances to succeed. But, in comparing equilibria across settings, this is no longer true. In our setting, all entrepreneurs respond to higher aspiration levels by working harder, yet the net e¤ect of all this additional e¤ort is to leave entrepreneurs in precisely the same place (in terms of chances of winning), as the comparison group with lower aspirations. Put di¤erently, if aspirations are a choice variable, i.e. entrepreneurs can "psych" themselves up by forming higher aspirations, then this will inevitably lead to a prisoner's dilemma for entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur would wish to psych herself up with great expectations to commit her future selves to work hard, but the net result collectively is a disaster since, in the end, the bene…ts of each entrepreneur's increased e¤ort is entirely cancelled out by other entrepreneurs, and failure is now more cataclysmic, given the resources poured into the venture.
One should, however, be a bit cautious in drawing this conclusion. The model assumes that the value of the entrepreneurial market is …xed and investments merely divide the market's (expected)
value among the entrepreneurs. In many settings, entrepreneurial investment has two functions, both to capture surplus and to create surplus. Introducing this second motive into the model would mitigate, or possibly reverse, our …nding that, in equilibrium, higher aspirations produce lower net surplus for all participants.
Fear of failure is more nuanced in its e¤ects. In terms of the value of increasing the chance of winning, it acts in the same fashion as the reference point, increasing e¤ort. This may be seen by examining the role of in the parenthetical expression to the right of the " "sign of equation (4) :
At the same time, the larger is ; the smaller is the "rebate"of costs incurred to achieve this higher probability, which is re ‡ected in the denominator term of equation (4) : Which factor dominates depends critically on the reference point, as the following corollary shows.
Corollary 1 Fix the number of competitors, n 2; the reference point, r; and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then increased fear of failure ( higher) raises equilibrium investment i¤ the reference point is su¢ ciently high, i.e. r > W + R n 1 n 2 :
Proving the corollary merely required routine di¤erentiation of equation (4) with respect to and then …nding conditions where the derivative is positive. Notice that, by Assumption 1, r < W + R; thus, for large values of n; the condition given in the corollary will almost certainly not hold and fear of failure will be de-motivating. By contrast, when n is small, one can easily show that that the condition required in Corollary 1 is easily satis…ed without violating Assumption 1. Thus, fear of failure can be highly motivating in settings with few competitors and su¢ ciently ambitious
entrepreneurs, yet this same degree of fear can paralyze e¤ort in more competitive settings, even when the level of ambition is unchanged.
Comparisons to Risk Neutrality
Corollary 1 also permits a ready comparison of e¤orts under loss aversion and those under risk neutrality since the risk-neutral case falls out when = 1. Thus, we know that, if the reference point is su¢ ciently high, entrepreneurs governed by fear of failure will outwork a group of riskneutral entrepreneurs. In low reference point situations, however, the reverse is true and risk-neutral entrepreneurs will work harder. Thus, the comparison would seem to come down to a question of what constitutes a reasonable reference point, an issue we shall return to in Section 3.3.
Is Fear of Failure Harmful?
There is, by now, a rich set of data concerning the actions, ambitions, and feelings of entrepreneurs. Our results suggest that the impact of fear of failure on outcomes such as level of investment or probability of success depend crucially on context. For instance, when there is a high degree of competition, fear of failure will be negatively associated with outcomes whereas, in situations with limited competition, the same level of fear may yield a positive association. Even for a …xed degree of competition, fear of failure can produce di¤erential outcomes depending on an entrepreneur's ambitions. Fear of failure is motivating (i.e. yields higher outcomes) for a highly ambitious entrepreneur but de-motivating for someone less ambitious. The broader point is that no general statement can be made as to whether fear of failure represents a handicap to be overcome or a positive character trait to be embraced for an entrepreneur trying to succeed.
The Decision to Become an Entrepreneur
Before deciding on how much to invest in their business, an aspiring entrepreneur needs to decide whether to forego employment and enter into entrepreneurship.
In this section, we analyze the entry decision of entrepreneurs. We assume that the entrepreneurship market is su¢ ciently large that we can ignore integer constraints. Entry, then, occurs up to the point where the gain/loss utility from entrepreneurship equals the gain/loss utility from employment. 10 From Proposition 1, it is a simple matter to show that, for a given n and r; the equilibrium gain/loss utility from entrepreneurship is EU (n; r) = R + (W r) ((n 1) + 1)
As one would expect, competition reduces equilibrium utility from entrepreneurship: equation (5) may easily be seen to be decreasing in n. Of greater interest is how changes in the reference point a¤ect equilibrium utility from entrepreneurship. That is, does a culture of high standards for success increase or decrease entrepreneurial involvement and happiness? On the one hand, a more ambitious reference point leads to more investment by entrepreneurs, but, collectively, produces lower gain/loss utility, as may be seen by inspection of equation (5) :
The equilibrium number of entrepreneurs is determined by an entry condition equating the expected gain/loss utility from the two career paths. Denote the reference point delineating gains
and losses under the outside option by : Formally, for a given r and , and treating n as continuous and interior, the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs, n , solves
where EU 0 denotes the expected gain/loss utility from employment and 2 f ; g represents the relevant gain or loss parameter depending on whether the payo¤s from employment lie above or below the reference point. The interesting case is where there is some competition in the entrepreneurship market, i.e., n 2: This requires a high enough payo¤ from winning the market.
A su¢ cient condition, strengthening Assumption 1, is Assumption 1a. Suppose that (1) a payo¤ equal to the endowment or less is always viewed as a loss, i.e. r; > W , (2) Employment is not viewed as failure, i.e. W + w and thus = ;
and (3) Entrepreneurship is su¢ ciently attractive compared to employment so that at least two entrepreneurs enter in equilibrium, i.e. R > ( + 1)
We are now in a position to characterize equilibrium entry:
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1a holds, then there is a unique n 2 consistent with a symmetric investment equilibrium, where
1 0 Accounting for integer constraints requires that we choose the integer ‡oor of the value of n solving for this equality, making the analysis more cumbersome but changing nothing of substance.
With equation (7) in hand, we are in a position to examine how the various forces a¤ect an individual's propensity to make the leap into entrepreneurship. Reassuringly, increases in the economic gains from entrepreneurship make individuals more likely to become entrepreneurs. Speci…cally, n may be readily seen to be increasing in the rewards from winning the entrepreneurial market, R; and (perhaps somewhat less readily seen to be) decreasing in the employment wage, w: Such results are, of course, standard when individuals are driven purely by pecuniary payo¤s.
Rather more interesting, and unique to our setting, are the e¤ects of various psychological factors on the decision to become an entrepreneur. Ambition, in the form of higher aspiration or reference points for success, dissuades individuals from pursuing entrepreneurship. The underlying motivation driving this outcome is that more ambitious individuals see the entrepreneurship path as potentially very costly. In the event they fail to succeed, failure is now more painful for having set such a high threshold. Moreover, success, even when attained, is less sweet since the outcome exceeds an individual's goal by only a small amount. A strategic e¤ect is also present. Recall that ambition motivated individuals to invest much time and treasure in their ventures. While this motivation is helpful to success once an individual has made the jump into entrepreneurship, it has the opposite e¤ect when individuals weigh their prospective futures under each path. Knowing that all will be risked once the commitment to entrepreneurship has been made, an ambitious individual pulls back from making the jump, wary of the stakes being risked. Formally, di¤erentiating n with respect to r; routine calculations reveal a negative relationship.
By contrast, setting an unrealistically high standard for success in employment increases the chances of becoming an entrepreneur. The connection between ambition and career choice under this scenario is relatively straightforward. Recall that the pecuniary gains from employment in the model are …xed regardless of individual talent or e¤ort. As a consequence, the higher the standard, the greater the disappointment will be experienced. Rather than pursuing such a frustrating path, an individual pursues entrepreneurship where, to some degree, she can control her destiny through e¤ort and investment. Formally, it may be readily shown that n is increasing in :
We now turn to fear of failure. The direct e¤ect may be readily seen by examining the lefthand side of equation (6) ; which computes expected gain/loss utility for a …xed n . Since the numerator is decreasing in and the denominator increasing, more fear of failure reduces expected utility. Since equilibrium entry equalizes this expression with an outside option payo¤, which is independent of ; it then immediately follows that greater fear of failure reduces the number of equilibrium entrants.
What Determines Aspirations?
Up until now, we have treated the measuring stick for determining success and failure merely as a
given. Yet clearly, aspirations are not formed in a vacuum. A combination of social and economic factors contribute to a¤ect the standard an individual applies to her own performance in deciding whether it counts as a success or not. One obvious factor in ‡uencing an individual's aspirations is her past experiences. For instance, MBAs at top universities are used to experiencing a high level of success in school, at work ,and in leadership activities outside of both spheres. It is often a rude shock to experience "failure," perhaps obtaining a B grade in a core class, after a lifetime of academic success. The same, no doubt, informs the expectations of entrepreneurs. Those that experienced signi…cant …nancial and leadership success in their previous employment will tend to have similar aspirations in the entrepreneurial sphere whereas those coming from more modest circumstances might count any improvement as a success.
To capture this idea, we imagine that all individuals begin on the employment path, but, at some point, they face the decision of whether to become an entrepreneur. This could be a decision they themselves initiate or a chance water cooler conversation with a colleague looking for a partner in a startup. In deciding whether to make the jump, individuals look back at their past earnings, e¤ort, and responsibilities, as well as projecting forward, to some degree, imagining raises and promotions that might arise in the near-term were they to continue with their current employer.
They might also contemplate the prospects from entrepreneurship as well though, having never been an entrepreneur and faced with the uncertainties of a new project, these expectations are likely to be rather more fuzzy.
Thus, we suppose that individuals anchor on the known and the foreseeable in making their determination of whether to switch or remain in employment. Speci…cally, they use the sam yardstick, recent employment earnings, to measure success and failure, regardless of which path they choose. For those that make the jump to entrepreneurship, this amounts to measuring success by "the road not taken"in the words of Robert Frost. Formally, the reference point along both paths
With this embodiment of r and , it is straightforward to determine equilibrium investment, e , and number of entrants n . Substituting the relevant reference points into equation ( ideas with fabulous upside, expressed as a higher value of R; are enticing. The better the prospects from winning the market, the more likely it is that an individual will make the jump. Once in the entrepreneurship arena, economic forces continue to matter both directly, through R; and indirectly, through w: As the value of the entrepreneurial market increases so too do investments. This is not as obvious as it might seem, at …rst blush, since there are two competing forces. The direct e¤ect is that, since the market is now worth more, making extra e¤orts to win now have higher payo¤s.
But, as we discussed above, with increased value comes increased entry, which dilutes the value of each dollar invested. All else equal, more competition produces less investment in equilibrium. In equilibrium, however, the direct e¤ect always dominates the competitive e¤ect. By contrast, the e¤ects of increased employment wages are easily seen and require no such trade-o¤. Higher wages (prevailing at the time), create a higher aspiration for success, which in turn promotes e¤ort. Also, higher wages act as a barrier to entry, depressing the amount of competition. Since success is now more attainable, the rewards for each additional hour spent or dollar sent are now higher. Both e¤ects push up investment.
But what about our main concern, fear of failure? Unsurprisingly, fear of failure is a powerful deterrent to entry. Intuitively, greater fear of failure pushes individuals toward the safer employment path and so the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs falls. Once individuals make the leap into entrepreneurship, we emphasized that, depending on aspirations, fear of failure could be motivating or de-motivating. When success is measured by the yardstick of the employment wage, remarkably, fear of failure has no direct e¤ect on investments. As we saw, depending on aspirations, fear of failure could be motivating or de-motivating. When aspirations are retrospective, and based on wage, we end up in the knife edge case where aspirations are entirely neutral. On the one hand, the culling e¤ect of fear of failure on the number of rivals encourages those making the leap to invest more. But there is a countervailing direct e¤ect-…xing the number of competitors, higher fear of failure always reduces investment when we endogenize the reference point in this fashion.
Essentially, aspirations borne of foregone opportunities are never su¢ ciently ambitious for fear of failure to be motivating. Strikingly, the two e¤ects exactly o¤set one another. Thus, one implication of this explanation of the origin of aspirations is that, the greater the fear of failure, the smaller the total investment made by entrepreneurs. The following result formalizes these observations. We eschew a formal proof since signing the associated derivatives of equations (8) and (9) is routine and straightforward.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumption 1a holds and that the aspiration levels, r and are determined by employment earnings.
The higher the value to the entrepreneurial market, the more entrepreneurs and the greater the investment per entrepreneur undertaken.
The higher the employment wage, the fewer the number of entrepreneurs and the greater the investment per entrepreneur undertaken.
More fear of failure produces fewer entrepreneurs but no less investment. Nonetheless, total investment in entrepreneurship activities always falls as fear of failure becomes more severe.
So what does this view of the origins of aspirations tell us about entrepreneurship? First, notice that this view of reference points is either retrospective or centered on the very immediate future. Individuals judge success by projecting their recent past and near future and looking to exceed these expectations. The model highlights that such a yardstick is, inherently, conservative.
Against such a yardstick, fear of failure can never be motivating, either in entry or in investment.
As best, it can be neutral (with investment) and at worst, depressing (as with entry). Under this 
Empirical Implications of Fear of Failure
In this section, we examine the predictions of the model that might be tested empirically. To the best of our knowledge, none of these implications have been tested for the simple reason that survey data identifying aspirations and the degree of fear of failure do not yet exist. While data exist with one or the other of these factors, as we show below, a key result concerns the interaction of the two. To recap, our model o¤ers predictions concerning both the propensity to enter as well as the intensity with which an entering entrepreneur will compete along these two dimensions. In terms of entry, the analysis supports the conventional view that fear of failure acts as a deterrent. Less intuively, the analysis also indicates that high aspirations also act as a deterrent to entry. The intuition, as we stated above is that, with high aspirations and any degree of fear of failure, a would-be entrepreneur anticipates that failure, if it comes will be severe owing to how far below aspirations failure lies. Thus, the would-be entrepreneur is repelled by this option more than, say, another individual with the same fear of failure and lower aspirations. We summarize these predictions of the model in hypothesis 1:
In predicting entrepreneurship among a pool of individuals, entrepreneurship is negatively associated with fear of failure and the level of aspirations for the venture to count as a success.
A key feature of our model is to study not just who becomes an entrepreneur but what entrepreneurs do after entering. While higher aspirations deter entrepreneurs from entering, post entry, higher aspirations produce larger investments and hence, all else equal, a greater chance at success. The e¤ects of fear of failure on post-entry choices is more nuanced. When paired with low aspirations, fear of failure is paralyzing and so produces low levels of investment and hence worse chances at success. By contrast, the combination of fear of failure and high aspirations strongly motivates individuals to work hard. While this motivation is entirely negative-working hard to avoid failure-it still contributes to success. Thus, conditional on being a successful entrepreneur, the analysis predicts both high aspirations and considerable fear of failure. Certainly, this seems a reasonable characterization of Jill Blashack Strahan, referred to in the Introduction. This leads to Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: Among a pool of entrepreneurs, higher aspirations lead to higher investment and more success. Conditional on low aspirations, higher fear of failure leads to lower investment and success; however, just the opposite is true conditional on high aspirations.
To perform equilibrium analysis while retaining tractability, we symmetrized the model; however, the predictions of Hypothesis 2 apply with equal force to an asymmetric model under the following conditions: Fix the investment of all other entrepreneurs and di¤erentiate equation ( 
Extensions
The goal of this section is to show that the intuitions derived from our model are not merely artifacts of speci…c assumptions, but rather represent forces present in any model wherein individuals su¤er from fear of failure. We highlight two potential fragilities of the model: the winner-take-all assumption and the determination of …rm performance. With regard to the …rst, we extend the model to allow k winners and show that this changes our intuitions about fear of failure not a whit.
Next, we show that the same is true of our speci…cation of …rm performance. With regard to the second, we generalize the perfomance process to a parametric class of performance functions that cover the gamut in their mix of luck and investment, ranging from all luck to all investment and all cases in between. We show that this too has no e¤ect on our …ndings. One technical note: Throughout the analysis, we relied on the fact that …rst-order conditions characterize optimal choices. It is routine to extend standard results to show that second-order conditions automatically hold with the distributional assumption we selected for the error term. More generally, this need not be the case. In an appendix, we establish the second-order conditions for these extensions.
Multiple Prizes
Here, we show that the winner-take-all aspect of the market plays no important role in driving entry and investment behavior of would-be entrepreneurs in the face of fear of failure. Using a framework proposed by Vesperoni (2013), we can extend the model to allow for k 1 winners.
The key is amending the success function to accommodate multiple winners while still maintaining tractability. Vesperoni proposes a success function where, when there are 3 entrepreneurs and 2
winners, each of whom earns the same reward, the chance that entrepreneur 1 wins a prize is given by
More generally, entrepreneur i's probability of winning when there are n entrepreneurs and k winners is the sum of the product of all permutations consisting of investments of k entrepreneurs that include e i divided by the sum of the product of all permutations consisting of investments of k entrepreneurs. This formula is complicated in general, but simpli…es dramatically if we assume that all entrepreneurs j 6 = i choose identical investments e while entrepreneur i chooses investment e i ; which su¢ ces for symmetric equilibrium analysis. In that case, the chance of success becomes
The point of such a complicated formulation is to retain the pairwise independence or Luce property of relative success while allowing for multiple prizes. 11 Vesperoni shows that his formulation is the unique solution (up to a class of monotone transformations of e) where the Luce property holds.
The basic idea of the formulation is this. Fixing the e¤ort levels of all n contestants, consider a situation where any two contestants, i and j, are removed from the general competition and pitted directly against one another. Using our earlier formulation, we can readily compute the chance that i wins or, equivalently, that i is ranked higher than j: Vesperoni's axiom requires that this same chance prevails in the n person competition and thus the relative ranking probability be independent of the number of other competitors. Thus, if i is 60% likely to defeat j in a two person competition, then i is also, with 60% probablility, likely to rank higher than j in n player competition. Notice that, when k = 1; this formulation reduces to the success function used earlier.
Utilizing this structure, we may now easily extend the model to allow for k winners in the entrepreneurship market. To maintain comparability with our early, winner-take-all structure, we normalize the overall value of winning the market to be R and hence each individual prize becomes R=k when there are k winners. Thus, when n entrepreneurs enter the market and compete for k prizes, entrepreneur i chooses investment e i to maximize: 12
+ 1 e i n 1
Following steps exactly analogous to the k = 1 analysis and amending Assumption 1a appropriately we obtain Assumption 1a 0 . Suppose that (1) a payo¤ equal to the endowment or less is always viewed as a loss, i.e. r; > W , (2) Employment is not viewed as failure, i.e.
W + w and thus = ;
and (3) Entrepreneurship is su¢ ciently attractive compared to employment so that at least two entrepreneurs enter in equilibrium, i.e. R >
Proposition 5 In a market with n entrepreneurs consisting of k winners each receiving value R=k;
the unique equilibrium investment equals
Furthermore, given Assumption 1a', if entry is unrestricted, n = min N; k 1 1 + 1
! entrepreneurs are entering the market.
The formulation of equilibrium e¤ort, e ; and the number of entrants, n ; in Proposition 5 is extremely familiar, which is hardly surprising since it nests the winner-take-all case as k = 1:
Notice, however, that k enters in a straightforward way in both equations and hence our earlier analysis about the impact of ambitions, fear of failure, and their interaction is entirely unaltered (qualitatively) by this extension of the model.
Luck, Skill, and Success
Previously we assumed that performance was given by the product of investment and luck, which we modeled as y i = e i " i : Since we assumed that " i was extreme value Weibull distributed, this imposes a speci…c mix of investment and luck on the chances of success. Suppose instead, we slightly amended the model to the more ‡exible form: y i = e i " i ; where is a parameter common to all contestants. As with our multiple prize analysis, this extension of the model also nests our original formulation as a special case where = 1. If we perform a change of variable, letting = =(1 + ); then it is readily apparent that the parameter represents the weight on investment in the chances of success. The complement, 1 ; represents the weight placed on luck. When = 0; which corresponds to = 0; only luck matters, whereas, when = 1; which corresponds to = 1; only investment matters. The main model places equal weight on investment and skill, since = 1=2 when = 1:
It may be readily shown that this speci…cation produces a success function given by:
or, equivalently, using weighting notation
We will extend our results, characterizing equilibrium levels of investment and entry with exogenous reference points while varying the weight placed on luck. 13 First, we show that the main e¤ects of fear of failure identi…ed in the main model also hold for its extension. Second, we highlight the intuitive role played by the weight on luck, both on investment and entry.
Symmetrizing preferences and repeating our earlier analysis with this new speci…cation when there are n entrepreneurs, we obtain the equilibrium investment amount e = (n 1) (R + ( 1) (r W )) n + (n 1) + (n ) (n 1)
As usual, whether fear of failure is motivating or de-motivating depends on aspirations. In this case, it may be readily shown that e is increasing in fear of failure, ; if and only if
The e¤ects of placing greater weight on luck is, intuitively, to reduce e¤ort, which may be readily seen by di¤erentiating e with respect to to obtain the expression
and similarly, using backward induction, we can …nd the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs as
Assumption 1a provided conditions for situations where the reference point was not so high that winning the entrepreneurial competition was counted as a loss, and the prize was su¢ ciently attractive that at least two individuals would become entrepreneurs. The analogous condition for the more ‡exible success function is:
Assumption 1a 00 . Suppose that (1) a payo¤ equal to the endowment or less is always viewed as a loss, i.e. r; > W , (2) Employment is not viewed as failure, i.e. W + w and thus = ; and (3) Entrepreneurship is su¢ ciently attractive compared to employment so that at least two entrepreneurs enter in equilibrium, i.e. R >
The key thing to notice is that implications about the level of ambitions and fear of failure are entirely unchanged by this new formulation; thus, Hypotheses 1 and 2 remain valid regardless of the weight given to luck versus investment (so long as equilibrium is pure strategies).
This version of the model also permits us to explore how weights placed on luck a¤ect entry and subsequent competition among entrepreneurs. One might think that individuals would be more attracted to markets where they are more in control of their fate, i.e. where investment dominates;
however this is not the case. To see this, …rst notice that, since no individual has an advantage in investment generation over her rivals, in equilibium, the chance of winning remains the same, 1=n;
regardless of the weight placed on luck. Hence, greater control o¤ers no greater chance of winning.
Moreover, as the weight placed on luck increases, the marginal returns to investment fall and hence competition becomes less …erce. Thus, intuition suggests, and formal analysis con…rms that the greater the weight placed on luck, the more attractive the market, i.e. n is strictly decreasing in : We prove this claim formally in the appendix.
Conclusions
The decision to pursue entrepreneurship-founding an internet startup, pursuing an invention, or opening a restaurant-is momentous, and often life-changing. Fundamentally, this choice is about perceived gains and losses: the payo¤s from entrepreneurship may be large relative to the safer employment path, but the sacri…ces required and the potential losses experienced are also great. In part, these hazards are inherent to the entrepreneurship environment. But the dice of fate are, in e¤ect, loaded depending on the level of competition. Success is more likely the fewer the number of competitors pursuing the same idea.
The conventional view is that gains and losses represent purely pecuniary outcomes (or money metric equivalents in terms of the sacri…ce of time and e¤ort). Yet individuals rarely use such language to describe their situation or their choices. Rather, individuals think of themselves as either succeeding or not, a contextual view based on some internal yardstick for coding results as success or failure. Moreover, many individals cite fear of failure as a hurdle to pursuing entrepreneurship in the …rst place. The practical literature on becoming an entrepreneur often confers advice about how one can overcome such fears, mainly by revising the yardstick itself.
In this paper, we take this notion seriously, de…ning payo¤s, which represent a combination of the pecuniary and the psychic, as gains or losses relative to a benchmark for success. Fear of failure, then, can be understood as the degree to which falling short of the benchmark, i.e.
failure, is more painful than success, to the same degree, is pleasurable. Expressed in this way, the model becomes isomorphic to one in which individuals experience loss aversion, where the success benchmark represents the reference point.
We then study how changes in the benchmark, i.e. di¤ering aspirations, interact with fear of failure to a¤ect behavior. While many studies focus purely on the decision to become an entrepreneur, we also study the choices made post-entry-how large a sacri…ce will entrepreneurs make?
How do these sacri…ces change with aspirations and fear of failure? In part, we are motivated by the many stories of successful entrepreneurs viewing fear of failure not as something debilitating, but rather as providing additional motivation. Is this mere post-hoc rationalization meant to portray success and sacri…ce in a more ‡attering light, or is there something to the idea of fear of failure as motivation? We …nd that, whether fear of failure is motivating or de-motivating depends crucially on aspirations. Those with high aspirations derive strength to make additional sacri…ces and undertake extremes of e¤ort from fear of failure. By contrast, those with more moderate aspirations …nd fear of failure profoundly depressing and de-motivating in the model. Importantly, this suggests a new channel for understanding why some entrepreneurs succeed and others do not. Even more importantly, it suggests that simply adding fear of failure as an explanatory variable in an empirical study is unlikely to yield signi…cant results-its interaction with aspirations is essential. While our formal equilibrium characterization relies on competitors being similar, we strove to show which implications are general, and would survive in an asymmetric model.
From the perspective of entry, however, the advice books for entrepreneurs are on the mark.
The model suggests that fear of failure reduces the chance of entry, regardless of aspiration level.
Moreover, this stems not from naive behavior where individuals fail to anticipate its motivational e¤ect, but from sophisticated behavior where motivational aspects are anticipated. Simply put, from an ex ante perspective, a rational individual, albeit one deriving payo¤s relative to a personal benchmark for success, will see the gains in motivation outweighed by the costs associated with possible failure, costs which will be ampli…ed by the enormous sacri…ces undertaken in pursuit of success. Thus, by studying entry alone, the model predicts a deceptively negative view of fear of failure. Indeed, viewed solely from that perspective, overcoming such fears seems a useful exercise. 
Appendix
This appendix contains proofs of the propositions o¤ered in the text.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, for a given r and n; equilibrium investment in the unique symmetric equilibrium is given by equation (4) :
Proof. Temporarily assume that winning the market is coded as a gain and losing is coded as a loss. (We will verify that this is the case given Assumption 1 later.) Di¤erentiating equation (1) with respect to e i yields the …rst-order condition: P k6 =i e k P n j=1 e j 2 ((W + R e i r) + (e i + r W )) + e i P n j=1 e j ( 1) = 0
It is routine to verify that equation (1) is strictly concave in e i ; hence the …rst-order condition is both necessary and su¢ cient.
Solving for a symmetric equilibrium, we have (n 1) n 2 e ((W + R e r)) 1 n n 1 n + (n 1) n 2 e (e + r W ) = 0 and, taking a common denominator, the condition reduces to (n 1) ((W + R e r)) ne (n 1) ne + (n 1) (e + r W ) = 0 which yields equation (4).
Finally, we need to verify that, under the equilibrium investment, winning the market constitutes a gain; that is W + R e > r is satis…ed. Substituting for the equilibrium value of e, the required inequality becomes:
W + R (n 1) R + (r W ) ( 1) (2n 1) + (n 1) 2 > r
Cross-multiplying
(W + R r) (2n 1) + (n 1) 2 (n 1) (R + (r W ) ( 1)) > 0 R n + (n 1) 2 (r W ) (n + n (n 1)) > 0 And this condition is satis…ed when:
r W < n + (n 1) 2 n + n (n 1) R which is identical to Assumption 1.
Corollary 1 Fix the number of competitors n 2, the reference point r, and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then increased fear of failure ( higher) raises equilibrium investment i¤ the reference point is su¢ ciently high, i.e. r > W + R n 1 n 2 .
Proof. We measure the intensity of loss aversion by ; thus di¤erentiating equation ( The sign of this expression turns on n 2 (r W ) R (n 1) n+ n(n 1) ] equilibrium investment increases in the intensity of lossaversion. Lastly we need to check whether, given Assumption 1, the latter case can arise. To see that this is possible, notice that W + R n 1 n 2 < W + R n 1 n since n > 1. We will now show that the upper bound on r given in Assumption 1 is greater than the RHS of this inequality. That is, we will show that W + R n 1 n < W + n + (n 1) 2 n + n (n 1) R:
Simplifying, we require only that n + (n 1) 2 n + n (n 1) > n 1 n And cross-multiplying yields the condition n 2 > n (n 1)
which always holds since n > 1. Thus, when the reference point is high enough, or r 2 W + R n 1 n 2 ; W + R n + (n 1) and di¤erentiating this expression with respect to n, we obtain @EU (n; r) @n = 2 ( (n 1) + 1) R + (r W ) ( 1) 2n 1 + (n 1)
where the inequality follows from the fact that n > 2 and r > W . Since EU (n; r) is strictly decreasing in n while U 0 is constant in n; there is a unique number of entrants in equilibrium.
Next, we solve for n in closed form. Clearly, if EU (N; r) U 0 , then n = N . If EU (N; r) < U 0 , then n solves EU (n; r) = U 0 , which yields (n k) n (R + k (r W ) ( 1)) < 0 and thus the second order conditions always hold.
Furthermore, a deviation to e i = 0 given all other entrepreneurs invest e is not pro…table as U (0) = (W r) < (W + w )
Extension: The Luck Component of Entrepreneurial Success
Proof. While deriving the equilibrium from the …rst-order conditions is straightforward and parallel to our earlier analysis, we still need to verify that the …rst-order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient. Here, we establish under which conditions the second-order conditions hold.
Expected gain-loss utility from entering the entrepreneurship market is equal to e i P n j=1 e j (W + R e i r) + 1 e i P n j=1 e j ! (W e i r)
n and e are found following the analogous procedures as in the proofs of the baseline model. Since there is a unique symmetric solution to these equations, ensuring the su¢ ciency of the …rst-order approach requires that we locally check the second-order conditions and verify that the payo¤s under the putative symmetric equilibrium exceed those from corner solutions.
To establish local concavity, we twice di¤erentiate e i and evaluate at the equilibrium, which, using e , yields (n + (n 1) + (n 1) (n )) (( 1) (n 1) 1 ) (n 1) n ((r W ) ( 1) + R)
Note that this expression is always negative for 1: Thus for these cases our analysis always applies. For 1 < 2; we require for the second order conditions to hold that This need not always hold. Notice that the right hand side is decreasing in : Thus, for high levels of fear of failure, the second order conditions may be violated for 1 < 2:
It remains to show that a player cannot pro…tably deviate by switching to a corner solution where e i = 0: The expected gain/loss utility under such a deviation is U (0) = (W r) < (W + w ) and thus this deviation is not pro…table.
